INTRODUCTION
Research in multiple disciplines has established that the role of litigation and courts in the creation and implementation of public policy in the United States has grown dramatically. 2 Central to this revolution were (1) an outpouring of rights-creating federal statutes, many of which contained attorney's fees or damages provisions that were designed to stimulate private enforcement, 3 and (2) the modern class action, born around the time when Congress began ramping up statutory private enforcement regimes.
Although the consequences and normative implications of this revolution have been the focus of intense debate, 4 scholars have neglected systematic examination of the counterrevolution against private enforcement that ensued. Our recent work seeks to fill this gap in the literature by assessing the counterrevolution from an institutional perspective. In a series of articles 5 and a book, 6 we document how the Executive Branch, Congress and the Supreme Court-wielding both judicial power under Article III of the Constitution and delegated legislative power under the Rules Enabling Act 7 -have fared in efforts to reverse or dull the effects of statutory and other incentives for private enforcement. 8 In this Article we focus specifically on class actions, situating their consideration in the framework, and fortifying it with data, that we have developed as part of that project.
In our work addressing the larger phenomenon, we find that the counterrevolution became essentially a partisan project beginning with the first Reagan Administration. 9 Recognizing the political infeasibility of retrenching substantive rights, the movement's strategy was to undermine the infrastructure for enforcing them. We show that the project was undertaken in earnest but largely failed in the elected branches, where efforts to diminish opportunities and incentives for private enforcement by amending federal statutory law were substantially frustrated. 10 We also show that, although Chief Justices appointed by Republican presidents have hoped to bring about major retrenchment through amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, success has proved elusive and episodic, despite appointments that caused the Advisory Committee to be dominated by Republican-appointed judges and practitioners representing business. 11 We then document the sharply contrasting success of the counterrevolution in the federal judiciary. 12 Over the past four decades, incrementally at first but more boldly in recent years, the Supreme Court has transformed federal law from friendly to unfriendly, if not hostile, to the enforcement of rights through private lawsuits. 13 We offer an institutional account of why conservative judges on a court exercising judicial power succeeded where their ideological compatriots in Congress, the White House, and the primary rulemaking committee largely failed. In doing so, we emphasize distinctive institutional properties of the judiciary. First, the Court is governed by a streamlined decisional process and simple voting rules, making it capable of unilateral action on controversial issues. Second, life-tenured federal judges are largely insulated from the forces and incentives of democratic politics, providing the Court with considerable freedom to act decisively on divisive issues. Third, in eras of divided government and party polarization, the Court faces less credible threats of statutory override, thus enjoying more policymaking discretion. Fourth, the law governing or driving private enforcement, perceived by most observers as legalistic and technical, provides the Court with a pathway to retrenchment that, as we demonstrate empirically, is remote from public view. This subterranean quality is reinforced by the slow-moving, evolutionary nature of case-by-case policy change. 14 We focus here on one particular instrument of private enforcement, but we do so in the light of our broader research. We begin with a sketch of the modern class action. We then consider how attempts to curb its enforcement potential have fared in the elected branches, at the hands of those who brought it forth-the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules-and, finally, in the decisions of the Supreme Court. We conclude that institutional patterns in class actions largely track the story we discern in our larger project: the Supreme Court has been the most successful institutional agent in retrenching law that governs or influences private enforcement. In other words, it is not just "the usefulness of Rule 23" that conservative Justices have been "bent on diminishing," 15 but the usefulness of statutory provisions and other legal rules that promote private enforcement in general. 13 The focus of our work is "the substance of law rather than its effects. We have not sought to measure the extent to which lawmakers have actually succeeded in affecting the incidence or qualitative impact of private enforcement of federal rights. Such an undertaking would require another book, and that book might not succeed, for the measurement challenges are monumental." BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 226. We also understand that our focus exclusively on decisions of the Supreme Court may distort the extent of judicially created legal change (or stasis), but we have yet to see systematic data that support that view.
14 See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 192-247; see also Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1580-82; Subterranean Counterrevolution, supra note 5, at 299-300 ("Although significant legislative or rulemaking reform proposals often present stark alternatives that trigger powerful interest group mobilization, the case-by-case, less visible, more evolutionary process of legal change via court decisions on seemingly technical and legalistic issues is far less likely to do so." (footnote omitted)).
15 Supra text accompanying note 1.
I. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted by an advisory committee appointed by the Supreme Court. In 1934, the Court was authorized to prescribe "general rules" of practice and procedure for the federal courts under a statute delegating federal legislative power. 16 Previously, federal class actions had been permitted in a limited set of circumstances based on the practice of courts of equity in England. 17 The class action rule that the Court promulgated in 1938 divided the world of group litigation into three parts, which came to be called "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class actions. 18 The classification turned on an analysis of the abstract nature of the rights involved that often verged on the metaphysical. 19 For this and other reasons, class actions did not play a major role in federal litigation from 1938, when the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, until 1966.
In that year, amendments to the Federal Rules became effective that initiated a sea change in the use of group litigation. The Advisory Committee's stated agenda in revising Rule 23 was largely uncontroversial. 20 In connection with the rule on class actions, as with other joinder rules, they sought to turn federal jurisprudence from abstract inquiry to functional analysis that considers the practical as well as the formal legal effects of litigation. 21 To that end, in Rule 23(a) they specified four requirements applicable to all litigation if it was to proceed as a class action-colloquially referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 22 But in Rule 23(b), they also reformulated the categories appropriate for class action treatment and specified different procedural requirements depending on the category.
It was the third category (Rule 23(b)(3)) that marked the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 as a notable break from the past. Here, a court may certify a case as a class action if it finds that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." If the court does so certify, Rule 23 requires that notice be given to the members of the class and that they thereby be given an opportunity to opt out of the action, avoiding its preclusive effects. 23 Although the Advisory Committee could not have foreseen all of the effects of their handiwork in Rule 23(b)(3), 24 they recognized that this provision would enable some claimants for whom individual litigation would be economically irrational (those with "negative value claims") to band together in group litigation against a common adversary. Contrary to the view espoused by the Supreme Court 25 (and many commentators), however, this was not the Advisory Committee's main purpose in 23(b)(3). 26 The Court's interpretation is difficult to square with the Advisory Committee Note, which foregrounds the goal of "achiev[ing] economies of time, effort, and expense, and promot[ing] uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated." 27 Class actions packaging negative value claims create litigation; they do not make existing or prospective litigation more 22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.").
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 24 See Marcus, supra note 20, at 608 ("Class actions were a litigation backwater when they began work, but they seemed to have some sense that their obscure rule would assume far greater importance going forward." (footnote omitted) The only reference to small claims in the section of the Note explaining (b)(3) came toward the end. In discussing the interest of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits (one of the factors pertinent to predominance and superiority), the Committee observed that such interest may be "theoretic rather than practical . . . [because] the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable."
29 These aspects of the revised rule were added late in the drafting process to meet concerns that the subdivision might be used by defendants, in league with class counsel, to bind those with large individual claims through group litigation "inimical to their interests." Stephen B. Marcus , supra note 20, at 605 (noting concerns put forth by committee member John Frank that Rule 23 could result in collusive settlement negotiations and "give defendants classwide preclusion at an unjust discount"). 30 The Amchem Court relied heavily on Kaplan's articles. The small-claims class action loomed larger among Kaplan's goals than it did among those of the Advisory Committee as a whole. Moreover, it only became prominent in his remarks to the Committee late in the process of developing the rule, when the argument that (b)(3) was the "small man's rule" was useful in response to repeated efforts by Advisory Committee member John Frank to delete the entire subsection. As evidenced by the legislative responses to amended Rule 23 in the 1970s that we discuss in Section III, 32 it did not take long to recognize that the small-claims class action presents a difficult public policy dilemma. On one view, that dilemma is how to provide sufficient access to court in a society that relies heavily on private litigation for the enforcement of important legal norms, while ensuring fidelity to those norms and the regulatory policies underlying them, avoiding unfairness to defendants and others affected by litigation, and respecting the limited capacity of the courts. The puzzle is that this dilemma was not apparent to the group that drafted the amendments or the other bodies that considered them before they became effective.
One possible explanation, already suggested by our discussion of Rule 23(b)(3), is that, far from being pre-occupied with negative value claims, the Committee did not give them adequate attention. That would have required considering the costs as well as the benefits of animating them. Another explanation is that the Committee did not anticipate developments in substantive law, statutory private enforcement regimes, and the legal profession that catalyzed the economic incentives of the class action. 33 Still another possible explanation for the Advisory Committee's failure to engage with this and other public policy dilemmas presented by the modern class action lies in the process they followed in fashioning the 1966 amendments. Had that process been more inclusive and transparent, tradeoffs that became obvious soon after the amendments came into effect might have received adequate attention. Instead, a pamphlet containing all proposed amendments that were to become effective in 1966-a group far larger than the proposed amendments to Rule 23-was "widely distributed to the bench, bar and law schools in March 1964 
II. THE RESPONSE OF THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS
In an environment of proliferating regulatory statutes and greater competition within the legal profession, the potential of the 1966 amendments to enable attorneys to do well by doing good (or, depending on one's perspective, to enrich themselves) was quickly realized, as was the potential of the (b)(3) class action to promote inefficient overenforcement of substantive law. This problem surfaced quickly and dramatically in litigation under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), a complex regulatory statute enacted in 1968 that promotes private enforcement by authorizing minimum and maximum statutory damages and attorney's fees (in addition to actual damages, if any, which are difficult to prove). 38 Although such provisions make sense as part of a private enforcement regime to induce individual litigation, minimum statutory damages can lead to devastating liability for technical statutory violations in a class action. 39 Troubled by this evident misfit, some federal district courts refused to certify (b)(3) class actions in TILA litigation, 40 prompting Congress to cap the statutory damages recoverable in a class suit at the lesser of one percent of the creditor's net worth and, first (in 1974), $100,000, 41 then a few years later (in 1976), $500,000. 42 Indeed, of the eight bills to reduce the opportunities or incentives for class actions that were introduced in Congress from 1973 (when the Library of Congress bill database starts) 43 to 1980, four were targeted at this specific problem. 44 Another bill would have made class actions unavailable in cases asserting claims valued at less than ten dollars, 45 suggesting that interest extended beyond the phenomenon of overenforcement to the very concept of using class litigation to vindicate small claims, prevent unjust enrichment, or deter illegal conduct.
The existence of such interest on the part of the Executive Branch was made clear in ambitious proposed legislation developed by the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice in the Carter Administration's Department of Justice. In August 1978 Senator DeConcini (for himself and Senator Kennedy) introduced this proposed legislation as S. 3475. 46 The accompanying commentary prepared by the Justice Department sets out the case for a legislative approach, observing that "revision of class damage procedures should be accomplished by direct legislative enactment rather than through the rule-making process," because "deterrence of widespread injury is of substantial public interest, and Congress should devote extensive consideration to any proposal." 47 The commentary also argued that, because such revision "would have significant economic ramifications," there were "serious questions as to whether [it] is appropriately within the scope of the rule-making authority granted by the Rules Enabling Act." 48 The proposed legislation would have repealed Rule 23(b)(3), replaced the small-claims class action with a public action (brought by or on behalf of the when applied to a particular statute, it surely must start with the level of enforcement sought by the legislature . . . ." (footnote omitted)). For a list of statutes in which Congress has limited remedies available in class actions, see Brief for Respondent at Appendix A, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (2017) ("Indeed, lurking in the background of the story of 1978 is the bracing possibility that the Rules Enabling Act, for all its virtues…has been a systematically enervating force…in an increasingly dense and interconnected regulatory world.").
United States), 49 and restructured large-claims class ("compensatory") actions 50 to "increase the fairness of the procedure and to make it less expensive and time consuming." 51 The commentary asserted that the "use of the Rule 23(b)(3) compensation-oriented procedures for actions brought to remedy pervasive small harm has posed major problems for plaintiffs, defendants [,] and the courts." 52 The bill thus sought to respond to problems created by Rule 23 and Supreme Court decisions interpreting it (in particular those concerning notice), for plaintiffs and the federal courts, as well for defendants. 53 A revised bill was introduced in the House in 1979. 54 Nothing came of this legislative initiative. 55 The Carter Administration's proposal is notable precisely because it was led by Democrats. As we discuss below, in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a modest volume of bill activity seeking to limit class actions, and support for the bills was higher among Democrats. One possible interpretation of this finding is that, once the catalytic regulatory potential of amended Rule 23 became clear, Democrats-the primary architects of the Litigation State-took the lead in attending to its supervision and calibration prior to the emergence of the counterrevolution. This is consistent with our conclusion, after examining a larger Congress (1995 Congress ( -1996 , with Republicans supporting anti-litigation proposals at a level about 563% above Democrats.").
In order to map legislative activity for class action retrenchment and its partisan configuration, we identified all bills that sought to amend federal law so as to restrict opportunities and incentives for class actions. Our search captured sixty-eight bills from 1973 to 2014. The bills had an average of about 22 co-sponsors, yielding a total of 1511 episodes of legislators sponsoring or co-sponsoring a bill with a provision seeking to limit class actions. The top panel of Figure 1 represents a count, per Congress, of episodes of legislators sponsoring or co-sponsoring anti-class action provisions. The first year of each Congress is indicated on the horizontal axis. Prior to the 102nd Congress (1991) (1992) , the level of bill activity was modest. After the 102nd Congress, it grew steeply for six years, peaking in the 105th Congress (1997-1998), and then declined to the point that by the 112th and 113th Congresses (2011-2014), support levels approached zero, as in most Congresses prior to 1991.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 represents the net partisan balance of support, which is the total number of Democratic sponsors or co-sponsors in each Congress minus the total number of Republicans. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when there was a modest volume of bill activity, the balance was moderately on the Democratic side. Beginning in the 102nd Congress (1991-92), the partisan balance shifted to the Republican side. It grew materially in that direction until the 105th Congress (1997-1998), after which it went into decline. By about the 110th Congress (2007-2008) the issue had receded from the legislative agenda and ceased to have discernable partisan valence. In order to analyze the relationship between legislators' ideology and the likelihood that they would support anti-class action provisions, we constructed the following dataset. Separately for each legislator who served in Congress from 1973 to 2014, we calculated the total number of episodes of sponsorship or co-sponsorship per Congress. 57 We run negative binomial count models on this dependent variable. In our key independent variable of political party, 57 We include both sponsors and co-sponsors because we are interested in the degree of legislative support for class action retrenchment proposals. To neglect co-sponsors would be to treat a bill that a legislator introduces only for herself as equivalent to one that dozens of other members of Congress support.
Democrats are coded 0 and Republicans are coded 1. We employ Congressfixed effects with standard errors clustered on legislator. 58 In Table 1 , we present three models estimating the effects of legislator party on support for anti-class action provisions: one covering the full period, one covering 1973 to 1990, and one covering 1991-2014. In the model over the full period, there is a statistically significant party effect. Moving from Democrat to Republican is associated with a 189 percent increase in episodes of support for anti-class action provisions. Subsetting the data into the two time periods makes clear that the effect is driven by the post-1990 period. In the 1973-1990 model, the coefficient is significant at .1 and negative, indicating that support by Democrats was 139 percent higher than by Republicans. Recall, however, that during this period, aggregate levels of bill activity were very low. In the 1991-2014 period, where the vast bulk of bill activity lies, the coefficient turns positive and becomes highly statistically significant, indicating that moving from Democrat to Republican is associated with a 206 percent increase in the 59 predicted count of episodes of support for anti-class action provisions. Much of the legislative activity concerning class actions from the 102nd Congress (1991-1992) through the 109th Congress (2005-2006) was due to Republican-sponsored bills that ultimately led to enacted statutes: the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 60 ("PSLRA"), and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 61 ("CAFA"), only the first of which directly affected federal rights, with the second governing class actions brought under state law. Yet, among all of the bills captured in our data for the larger project, these statutes (together with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 62 ) were among a handful of consequential successes in the long-running legislative campaign for retrenchment of private enforcement of federal rights. Moreover, they were enacted after years of effort, attracting filibusters and presidential vetoes.
The limits on class actions that emerged from this legislative gauntlet in the PSLRA, we believe, are fairly characterized as modest because they do not challenge the core role of class actions in securities litigation, and they address class actions in only that one substantive context. 63 Ironically, congressional compromises on such matters as the fraud-on-the-market theory that were necessary to enact the legislation reduced the scope for the Supreme Court to raise other enforcement barriers in that context. 63 As John Coffee characterizes the changes effected by the law: "Essentially, it immunized 'forward-looking statements,' gave presumptive control of the class action to a 'lead plaintiff ' who had suffered the largest loss (which effectively meant that control went to the largest institutional investor to volunteer for the role), and imposed stricter pleading rules." COFFEE, supra note 26, at 125-26. Coffee concludes that " [d] espite predictions that the PSLRA would be the death knell for securities class actions, not that much has actually changed." Id. For a discussion of the 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), see id. at 126.
64 See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1201 (2013) ("Because Congress has homed in on the precise policy concerns raised in Amgen's brief, we do not think it appropriate for the judiciary to make its own further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 23 to make likely success on the merits essential to class certification in securities-fraud suits." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
John Coffee notes that "several recent Supreme Court decisions have declined the opportunity to cut back drastically on the class action." COFFEE, supra note 26, at 132. Two of the three decisions he mentions in support of that proposition were securities class actions. Id. at 268 n. 22. The last observation helps to understand the strategy of those proponents of CAFA whose actual agenda, in vastly expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear state law claims brought as class actions, was to ensure that the cases were not certified and went away. 65 In contrast to the PSLRA, where class action retrenchment required legislative compromise that limited its reach in later court decisions, CAFA channeled class actions into the federal courts, an institutional environment in which more aggressive retrenchment was possible under a transsubstantive Federal Rule. The move from state to federal court meant that class certification decisions would be governed not by autonomous and potentially liberal state class action doctrine, but by an ever-more-conservative federal class action jurisprudence. Moreover, the growing volume of state law class actions in federal court provided more and more varied opportunities for federal courts to develop that jurisprudence. Finally, because Federal Rules apply across substantive claims, increasingly anti-class action doctrine developed in state law cases also governs enforcement of federal rights.
CAFA showed how useful "procedural" legislation could be to furthering the strategy, traceable to the Reagan Administration, of laying the foundation to retrench private enforcement by empowering federal courts to accomplish what could not be effectuated in other, more democratic, institutional sites. 67 The counterrevolution had been put in the hands of those best equipped institutionally to achieve its goals.
III. THE RULEMAKERS' RESPONSE
The Advisory Committee that drafted the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 was composed primarily of practitioners and academics, with very few judges (and those judges were equally balanced between Democratic and Republican appointments). He noted certain expressions of dissatisfaction with a number of specific procedural devices and suggestions for improvement. But he emphasized the need, not simply for the betterment of existing procedures, but for major changes in the way in which litigation is being handled. He advised the Committee that it was unique in that it could make recommendations in any area of civil litigation where it considered change desirable. 73 See Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1582 ("The Advisory Committee sent forward to the Standing Committee only fourteen proposals for amendments (at the rule level) . . . . Moreover, we determined that only two proposals for amendments were salient to the issue of private enforcement, and both of those proposals were pro-enforcement.").
Minutes of the
74 At its first meeting in 1971, "the Committee requested the reporter to undertake a study of the desirability of effecting changes in" Rule 23 (Class Actions) and Rule 16 (Pre-Trial Procedure). 1971 Minutes, supra note 72, at 2. 75 We think it probable that the Chief Justice stimulated this interest in Rule 23-that it was one of the "specific procedural devices" about which he "noted certain expressions of dissatisfaction" at the Committee's first meeting in 1971. Id. at 1. It was not, in any event, one of the subjects that received attention from the Special Advisory Group that he had appointed, the report of which the Advisory Committee considered at that first meeting. Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1580-81 n.67, 1582-83. evidence that the revolutionary potential of the 1966 amendments was quickly recognized. The decision may also signal recognition that those amendments were the product of a flawed process-conceived at a time when the Advisory Committee met in private, distributed proposals for comment to a relatively limited group, did not make written comments available to the public, and did not hold public hearings. From that perspective, the Advisory Committee charged by Burger may have been attempting to supplement the record in areas where knowledge was thin before proposing further action on Rule 23. 76 An additional reason to proceed cautiously emerged during the course of the Advisory Committee's study of class actions. 77 A core limitation that the Rules Enabling Act imposes is that Federal Rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 78 It was a serious question whether material amendments to Rule 23 would do so. The Enabling Act difficulties implicated in consequential class action reform would likely have become apparent by reason of the contemporaneously unfolding controversy surrounding the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. 79 These difficulties became even harder to miss in the Spring of 1977 when Justice Department officials briefed the Advisory Committee on legislative proposals to amend Rule 23. 80 As noted in Section II, the Justice Department subsequently posited "serious questions as to whether such revision is appropriately within the scope of the rulemaking authority granted by the Rules Enabling Act" when sponsoring legislation to replace Rule 23(b)(3). 81 No such legislation was enacted, but after it was introduced, class action reform disappeared from the Advisory Committee's agenda for more than a decade. 76 Thus, although saddled with the same cloistered process, the Advisory Committee sent a survey to federal judges, in response to which "50 percent of 145 district judges indicated that they favored prompt amendment of rule 23." 124 CONG. REC. 27,860 (1978) . 77 There is a big gap in the public record of Advisory Committee minutes during this period. A final reason that may explain why the 1970s Advisory Committee proceeded carefully with class action reform is that the Committee was not ideally composed to respond favorably to calls for major litigation retrenchment from organized bar groups or to pressure from the Chief Justice. For most of the decade judge-members who had been appointed by Democratic presidents, although in the minority, had substantial representation. A material imbalance arose (through attrition) only in the last two years. 82 By the time the Advisory Committee next took up possible amendments to Rule 23-in the early 1990s 83 -the balance of power on the Committee had tilted more sharply in favor of judges appointed by Republican presidents and of corporate practitioners. 84 There were, however, other obstacles to using rulemaking for class action retrenchment that had not impeded the proaccess 1966 amendments. Primary among them were changes to the Enabling Act process resulting from discontents that surfaced in the 1970s after the Federal Rules of Evidence imbroglio and intensified in the 1980s when the Advisory Committee, urged on by Burger, aggressively pursued measures that many deemed inimical to private enforcement.
These process changes, requiring more opportunities for public participation in rulemaking, greater transparency, and more time for Congress to consider proposed amendments, functioned as a control technique. Some proponents of the changes apparently hoped to entrench the pro-access status quo by making the rulemaking process stickier and empowering interest groups to monitor proposals and sound an alarm in the event of perceived overreaching. 85 In part for that reason and in part because of the qualities of those leading the effort, the approach taken to the consideration of class action reform in the 1990s could not have been more different from that taken in 82 See Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1584-85. 83 For a discussion of the Committee's 1982 decision "to do nothing," see Marcus, supra note 20, at 645. The potential for stickiness expands or contracts depending on the degree of deference shown to the Advisory Committee, which in turn is in part a function of the degree of control the Standing Committee exercises. In that regard, however, it is worthwhile recalling that the Chief Justice not only appoints all members of both committees, but also presides at the next two stages of review within the judiciary-the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court. the 1960s. In a series of meetings and conferences, the Advisory Committee sought information from expert practitioners, judges, and academics, and it initiated empirical work by the Federal Judicial Center. It then published proposed amendments for comment and held extensive public hearings. 86 At the end of the day, the Committee concluded that significant change to Rule 23 was so freighted with controversy among interest groups, and so problematic under the Enabling Act, that it should not be attempted by rulemaking. 87 The changes the Committee recommended instead, which went into effect in 1998 and 2003, were far more restrained than champions of class action retrenchment advocated, and they avoided the core elements of the rule. 88 Ironically, however, Rule 23 amendments that seemed modest at the time have facilitated major changes in class action jurisprudence through court decisions. The most obvious and important example is the 1998 amendment adding Rule 23(f). 89 Facially neutral as between plaintiffs and defendants, this amendment permits courts of appeals in their discretion to entertain immediate appeals from class-certification decisions. 90 It has enabled and highlighted another path to retrenchment of private enforcement by substantially expanding the opportunities for conservative federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, to control the course of class-action jurisprudence. This suggests that, even in the domain of rulemaking, some consequential reforms can fly under the radar screen. As previously noted and as elaborated in Section V, we argue that a similar phenomenon has been an important reason for the Supreme Court's success in furthering the goals of the counterrevolution through decisions on issues salient to private enforcement.
The Advisory Committee began considering whether additional Rule 23 amendments would be useful and feasible in 2011. A preliminary report by a subcommittee charged with that inquiry made clear that the effort was proceeding with the care and broad outreach of the 1990s class action initiative. 91 The topics under discussion included a number that were likely to engage ideological commitments, such as issue classes, 92 as well as topics on which the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is widely questioned, such as settlement classes. 93 At the end of the day, the Committee recommended for publication proposed amendments to Rule 23 addressing three principal topics: (1) "the process of settling class actions," (2) "the core considerations that should inform the court's review of a proposed settlement," and (3) "the handling of class member objections to proposed settlements." 94 The proposals again avoided core issues, although the Committee approved the subcommittee's recommendation that "two topics remain under study." 95 Those topics are so-called "pick-off issues" remaining after the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 96 and the extent to which the members of a putative class must be ascertainable in order for the class to be certified. 97 In deciding not to pursue topics such as issue classes and the requirements for certification of settlement classes, the rulemakers have again acknowledged the roadblocks to major class action retrenchment under the Enabling Act, particularly as amended in 1988. In explaining why they carved out topics for further study, they may also have implicitly acknowledged a new roadblock: having tasted the retrenchment potential of interpretation, 98 the Court may not be keen to surrender its position as the vanguard of the counterrevolution-its hammer-to which we now turn. 99
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE As the previous sections document, the course of the counterrevolution against the modern class action in the elected branches and in rulemaking under the Enabling Act has been similar to its course in the larger domain of legal issues relevant to private enforcement that we have studied. None of those institutions was very successful in changing the salient legal rules. In our other work we have found that, by contrast, the Supreme Court acting as such (rather than as promulgator of the Federal Rules) has been increasingly successful-and increasingly polarized-in retrenching rules salient to private enforcement, and we have explored institutional explanations for its relative success both theoretically and empirically. 100 It remains to consider whether the pattern holds as to class actions.
To set the stage, we present some of our findings on the Court's decisions in one of the larger domains we have examined. Our collection of Supreme Court data includes identification of all cases from 1960 to 2014 in which the Supreme Court decided an issue that turned on interpretation of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, where the result would either widen or narrow opportunities or incentives for private enforcement. Because we are particularly interested in class actions, we also included in our Federal Rules cases those that turned on an issue explicitly linked to the policies underpinning Rule 23, such as tolling a statute of limitations and claim preclusion. The search yielded 78 cases, containing 80 issues, and 693 Justice votes. The cases span 1961 to 2013 because none was decided in 1960 or 2014.
We find that, beginning around the early 1980s, there was a long decline in the probability of a pro-private enforcement vote. At the time this decline began, liberal and conservative Justices were fairly close together on Federal Rules private enforcement issues. However, there developed growing distance between liberal and conservative Justices, with escalating polarization after around 2000. We also find that Federal Rules private enforcement cases (much more so than other private enforcement cases) are dominated by business defendants and that this business-defendant skew grew 98 See Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1603-06 (describing the Court's ability to "bring about momentous civil litigation reform that would be impossible to secure from the legislature or its delegated procedural lawmaking bodies"); see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 65-130. 99 Of course, Justice Scalia's death and Justice Gorsuch's appointment render this doubly speculative. 100 See Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1580-82; Subterranean Counterrevolution, supra note 5, at 299-300; see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 130-248. starker after about 2000. Since about the same time, the Court has devoted materially more attention to Federal Rules private enforcement issues on its docket, and those cases have elicited dissents at increasingly and notably high rates. In the past fifteen years, plaintiffs are losing, and business defendants are winning, a huge majority of Federal Rules private enforcement cases, and this field is the locus of increasingly intense conflict among the Justices.
Finally, by way of background, we estimated the effect of ideology on the Justices' votes in Federal Rules cases. In the roughly two decades from 1995 to 2013, the reduction in the probability of a pro-private enforcement vote associated with moving from a liberal to a conservative Justice is sixty percent (we describe the liberal-conservative dichotomy below). Remarkably, in the 1995-2013 period, the effect of ideology on these procedure votes about tripled relative to the 1961-1994 period. It went from notably less than the effect observed when all private enforcement cases are pooled, in all federal rights issues, and in merits votes in policy areas underlying our private enforcement data, to being larger than all of them. 101 To investigate these issues in class action cases, we examined all cases from 1969 (the year of the first case decided after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23) to 2014 that turned on either an interpretation of Rule 23 or an issue explicitly linked to policies underpinning Rule 23. Our search yielded thirty-three cases, in which thirty-four discrete class action issues were decided. We treat the issue as the unit of analysis. This rendered a total of 291 Justice votes on class-action issues. This, of course, provides modest data for discussion and analysis. But, because this is the full universe, we find it informative to examine empirically. Our primary interest is to assess the relationship between the Justices' ideological preferences and their votes in class action cases, and whether and how this has changed over time. For our primary measure of Justice ideology, we rely on Martin-Quinn scores, which are based on Justices' voting behavior in all non-unanimous cases. 102 Use of these scores allows us to assess empirically whether class actions belong in the family of issues associated with the leftright divide, such as civil rights and economic regulation. Table 2 lists the raw proportion of pro-class action votes, relative to total votes, for each Justice who voted in more than five cases in our data. Two things stand out. First, the distribution from lowest to highest pro-class action votes roughly tracks the conservative-liberal dimension. The table also indicates whether a Justice is "conservative" (=1) or "liberal" (=0), dividing them according to whether they are above or below the median of the average annual Martin-Quinn score for Justices in our class action data who voted in more than five cases. 103 Every "conservative" has a lower pro-class action voting rate than every "liberal." A second notable feature of the table is the large disparity between conservative and liberal Justices' voting ratios. The scale ranges from Kennedy and Thomas voting in a pro-class action direction 17 and 18% of the time, to Sotomayor/Kagan and Douglas doing so 83 and 100% of the time. Figure 2 presents the raw number of pro-and anti-class action outcomes in each year. In years with no value reflected on the figure, no class action issues were decided. From 1969 (when the first case in our data appears) through the end of the 1970s, the clear preponderance of outcomes was anti-class action, with all but one of these cases decided after 1972, when conservative Justices secured a majority. In the 1980s, the clear preponderance was pro-class action. Only one class action issue was decided from 1989 to 1996 (in 1991). From 1997 to 2014, the balance was anti-class action. This decline has been substantially driven by the votes of conservative Justices, whose estimated probability of a pro-class action vote fell from an average of 42 percent in the 1980s to 22 percent in 2013. The estimated probability of a pro-class action vote increased for liberal Justices over the same period, from an average of 68 percent in the 1980s to 84 percent at the end of the series. Thus, the difference, or the ideological distance, between liberal and conservative Justices' voting on class action issues grew significantly over time. From an average of about 25 percentage points in the 1980s, it grew to 62 percentage points by the end of the series. It is evident that all of the long-run changes described in this paragraph were driven by cases decided in the 1997-2013 period.
Scholars have made similar findings concerning the Court's business decisions, and a similar phenomenon may explain both these trends: "[T]he increasing conservatism of the Court resulted in the Court's taking cases in which the conservative position was weaker than previously, leading to more opposition by liberal Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by those Justices in business cases." 104 This explanation is consistent with our sense, after reading all decisions in the database, that the growing distance we find in the been receptive. 111 Indeed, two cases involving class arbitration of federal claims are in our data because the majority's reasoning reflects, and is suffused with hostility to, class actions. One of them, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors, elicited the blunt indictment with which we begin this article. 112 When juxtaposed with the legal retrenchment that some of these decisions have effected, and others may effect, the few decisions in this period that were favorable to class actions do not appear to balance the scales. Thus, although we included in that small group the Court's decision holding that an absent class member who has objected to a proposed settlement need not intervene in order to appeal from approval of that settlement, 113 there are arguments for the opposite characterization. This is particularly so when one recognizes that objectors are not always out to improve the quality of settlements. We next construct a model using the votes of Justices on class action issues as the dependent variable and the Justices' ideology scores as the key independent variable. In addition to models using Martin-Quinn scores based on Justices' voting behavior, we present parallel models using Segal-Cover scores to measure Justice ideology. 120 In addition to the direct incorporation of the ideology measure into our models, we also assess whether ideology had a greater effect on Justices' votes on class action issues after the mid-1990s. To test this hypothesis, we model the post-1994 effect with a time dummy variable that takes the value of 0 from 1969 to 1994, and 1 from 1995 to 2013, interacted with the Justices' ideology score. The interaction allows us to assess whether there was a change in the effect of ideology on Justices' votes on class action issues after 1994.
We do so for several reasons. First, Republicans took Congress in the 1994 elections and have held at least one chamber almost continuously since, materially reducing the probability of legislative override. The logic of this theory is that Justices' votes may be constrained by the perceived threat of legislative override, and the diminution of that threat after 1994 may have widened their perceived range of policymaking discretion. 121 Moreover, civil litigation retrenchment in general-and class action retrenchment in particular-became a more salient issue in the Republican Party, and the locus of more partisan conflict, playing a notable role in Gingrich's "Contract with America" in the 1994 campaign, and in the Republican anti-litigation legislative program mounted in 1995. 122 Indeed, "Republicans made securities class action reform a centerpiece of their Contract with America in 1994," 123 and the bill data we presented earlier shows that anticlass action bills introduced by Republicans surged in the early to mid-1990s (Figure 1 ), having not previously been the locus of significant bill activity or a Republican issue. This elevation of class action retrenchment on the Republican Party agenda corresponded to an increasing focus on class actions by important advocacy groups associated with the Republican Party, specifically including business groups and conservative law reform organizations.
A window on this pattern can be found in amicus filings in the thirty of our thirty-three class action cases that did not also present a merits issue (assuring that amicus briefs were addressed to the class action issue). From 1969 through 1994, the Chamber of Commerce did not file an amicus brief in any of twenty cases, and from 1995 to 2014 they filed amicus briefs in seven of ten cases. When all business association amicus filings are aggregated, only two briefs were filed in twenty cases from 1969 to 1994, and twenty-eight briefs were filed in ten cases from 1995 to 2014. The Chamber's National Litigation Center has filed amicus briefs since it was founded in 1977. 124 However, the Chamber's turn to issues of procedure and court access-as contrasted with regulatory policy-was signaled by its 1998 founding of the Institute for Legal Reform, which characterizes itself as "the country's most influential and successful advocate for civil justice reform." 125 One of its key targets has been to limit class actions. 126 Growth in the Chamber's amicus filings in class action cases in the mid-1990s was part of a wider and concerted campaign of litigation retrenchment. 127 Conservative law reform organizations, too, materially elevated their amicus attention to class action issues in the mid-1990s. Among these groups, the two that participate most frequently as amicus filers in private enforcement cases are the Pacific Legal Foundation and the Washington Legal Foundation, emerging as vocal advocates against class actions. 128 Prior to 1995, these organizations ignored class action issues on the Supreme Court's docket and filed no briefs. From 1995 to 2014, they filed seven amicus briefs in ten cases. The story is similar with defense-side lawyers associations, which filed one brief in twenty cases from 1969 to 1994, and eight briefs in ten cases from 1995 to 2014. The Defense Research Institute was the most frequent filer among them. In aggregate, business associations, conservative law reform organizations, and defense-side lawyers associations filed three briefs in twenty cases from 1969 to 1994 (.15 per case), and fifty-one briefs in ten cases from 1995 to 2014 (5.2 per case). This amounts to a growth in amicus attention by a factor of thirty-five.
One might be tempted to conclude that this growth in amicus filings merely reflects a more general growth in amicus filings during the same period.
However, that would be a mistake. Viewing amicus filings in all cases decided by the Court, one observes 2.6 briefs per case for the 1970-1994 period, and 8.6 for the 1995-2014 period, which is 3.3 times larger. 129 This rate of growth pales in comparison to the 35-fold growth in class action amicus filings that we observe among these groups.
Returning to our empirical models, we additionally control for a number of other potentially relevant factors: (1) the outcome of the Court of Appeals ruling below; (2) the presence of a U.S. party advocating a pro-or anti-class action position; (3) whether the defendant was a government versus a business defendant, with business defendant as the reference category; (4) whether the underlying policy area was securities, antitrust, civil rights, other social regulation, or other economic regulation, with securities left out as the reference category. Table 3 reports logit models with standard errors clustered on judge. 130 The main effect of the ideology variable in the Martin-Quinn models is significant with a marginal effect of -.06. Because the interaction is included, this variable reflects the effect of ideology only in the period from 1969 to 1994. From a substantive perspective, the distance on the Martin-Quinn scale between the mean ideology scores of Justices designated conservative and liberal (see Table 2 ) is approximately 3.5. An increase of this magnitude in the ideology score is associated with a 21-percentage point reduction in the probability of a pro-class action vote. The interaction of ideology with the post-1994 dummy is significant, with a marginal effect of -.08. The effect of ideology in the post-1994 period is given by summing the marginal effects of the two variables (-1.4), such that moving from the average liberal to the average conservative is associated with a 49-percentage point reduction in the probability of a pro-class action vote.
In the Segal-Cover model, the main effect of the ideology variable is again significant with a marginal effect of .22. The distance on the Segal-Cover scale between the mean ideology scores of Justices above and below the median score in the data is approximately .59. In the Segal-Cover measure, larger values are associated with greater liberalism. A change of this magnitude in the conservative direction is associated with a 13-percentage point reduction in the probability of a pro-class action vote. The interaction of ideology with the post-1994 dummy is significant, with a marginal effect of .61. In the post-1994 period, moving from the average ideology of Justices on the liberal side of the Segal-Cover median to the conservative side is associated with a 49-percentage point reduction in the probability of a pro-class action vote. 131 129 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 130-92. 130 The ideology variables (both main effects and interactions) remain statistically significant in both models in alternative specifications with standard errors clustered on case.
131 Note that because of the interaction set up, the significant main effect of Post-1994 Dummy reflects the effect when ideology equals zero (the most conservative pole of the Segal-Cover score). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1
The two models, using very different measures of ideology, paint a consistent picture. Prior to 1995, the effect of ideology on Justices' votes on class action issues was significant but relatively modest. In the 1995-2013 period, the effect of ideology became substantively large, more than doubling by one measure, and more than tripling by another, during which time the probability of a pro-class action outcome fell materially. Moreover, the emergence of class action issues as notably ideologically divisive on the Court followed the emergence of class-action retrenchment by just a few years.
Almost overnight, it became a highly visible campaign of the Republican Party. It also corresponded to the dramatic rise in amicus advocacy in class action cases by business associations led by the Chamber of Commerce, conservative law reform organizations, and defense-side lawyers associations. In our view, the conservative wing of the Court's turn against class actions in the past fifteen years must be evaluated in the context of this wider partisan and interest group attack on class actions.
In presenting these data, we do not suggest that the Court's class action decisions reflected exclusively the ideological preferences of the Justices. That position would neglect "the messiness of lived experience," 132 which teaches that judges-even judges on a court that has the final (at least within the judiciary) word on matters of constitutional law-make decisions based on a number of considerations, including the law as they understand it. One such consideration, institutional self-interest (concerning the effect of a ruling on the docket of the federal courts), quite clearly influenced a number of the Court's class action decisions, particularly anti-access decisions in the late 1960s and the 1970s. 133 
CONCLUSION
From an institutional perspective, in recent years the Supreme Court has led the counterrevolution against class actions just as it has led the counterrevolution on the other issues salient to private enforcement that we have studied. Class actions have been the focus of legislative, rulemaking, and Supreme Court retrenchment efforts. In Congress, primarily Republican reformers had relatively modest success, focused in a few policy areas. The rulemakers, disproportionately led by Republican-appointed judges and corporate practitioners, but constrained in important ways by the Enabling Act process reforms of the 1980s, fared little better. 134 In marked contrast, the ("There is no compelling reason for this Court to overturn a settled interpretation of an important congressional statute in order to add to the burdens of an already overloaded federal court system."). For further discussion of several of these decisions, see Marcus, supra note 20, at 627-29 (discussing Snyder and Zahn); id. at 633-35 (discussing Eisen). 134 As we have stated, Supreme Court, led by its conservative wing, has issued a series of decisions making the governing legal rules more difficult for those seeking private enforcement through class actions. The results we report here look quite similar to those on the other issues we have tracked, particularly the Federal Rules issues (which contributed some of the data we analyze in this Article). As is true of the Federal Rules issues, the growing role of ideology is distinctive and palpable. Indeed, the gap separating liberal and conservative Justices' votes on class action and other procedural issues is materially greater than on federal rights in general. 135 As Justice Kagan all but said in the quotation that opens this Article, class actions have become a magnet for ideological judicial behavior.
One of the cases contributing data for this article, Wal-Mart, garnered a great deal of attention in the media. This prompted some who commented on our early work to question a hypothesis we advanced in seeking institutional explanations for the Supreme Court's relative success in the counterrevolution. As we framed that hypothesis more recently:
If, as many scholars believe, the Court's public standing and legitimacy are important to its institutional power, the need for broad public support and concern about negativity bias place some limits on its discretion to scale back highly visible substantive statutory rights directly. From the standpoint of legitimacy, the strategy of focusing on lower visibility private enforcement issues is preferable. When the Court is engaged in apparently technical and legalistic decisionmaking, the public perceives it as more objective, neutral, and legitimate. Indeed, the public is less likely to notice such decisions at all. 136 Systematic empirical study of how the media covered the issues in our data as a whole supports this hypothesis: they receive far less coverage than the underlying merits issues. 137 It is possible, however, that class action issues are different. For the present, we note that, however salient Wal-Mart was to members of the public, that salience owed little if anything to the issues that We do not doubt that most of the Advisory Committee's work is unaffected by members' ideological preferences, including in particular the ideological preferences of members who are judges. As our data confirm, few of the Committee's proposals predictably implicate private enforcement, and a great deal of its work does not map to a left-right ideological dimension. At least since the counterrevolution became a partisan project in the elected branches, however, we believe that the rulemaking proposals most likely to elicit ideological behavior are precisely those that will affect private enforcement. Dukes involved a massive sex-discrimination class action against a major nationwide corporation, making it the rare civil procedure case to draw significant scholarly and mainstream media coverage, which largely focused on its potential effect on substantive employment discrimination law."); see also id. at 315-16 ("Of course, having civil procedure on the doctrinal agenda will not draw the attention or ire of the popular media or the public; do not expect public calls to impeach Roberts over the scope of Rule 8(a).").
